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Abstract 
We present a mechanism for constructing 
graphical models, specifically Bayesian net­
works, from a knowledge base of general 
probabilistic information. The unique fea­
ture of our approach is that it uses a power­
ful first-order probabilistic logic for express­
ing the general knowledge base. This logic 
allows for the representation of a wide range 
of logical and probabilistic information. The 
model construction procedure we propose 
uses notions from direct inference to identify 
pieces of local statistical information from 
the knowledge base that are most appropri­
ate to the particular event we want to reason 
about. These pieces are composed to gener­
ate a joint probability distribution specified 
as a Bayesian network. Although there are 
fundamental difficulties in dealing with fully 
general knowledge, our procedure is practical 
for quite rich knowledge bases and it supports 
the construction of a far wider range of net­
works than allowed for by current template 
technology. 
1 Introduction 
The development of graphical representations for prob­
abilistic and decision-theoretic models [Pea88, 0890] 
has vastly increased the range of applicability of such 
models in AI. However, it appears that current graph­
ical representations are limited to specialized domains 
of knowledge--somewhere around the scope of modern 
expert systems. For a number of reasons, it seems im­
possible to use such models to represent, say, the gen­
eral medical knowledge possessed by a typical physi­
cian. 
A major limitation of current graphical representa­
tions is that they are propositional . That is, they 
*This work was supported by NSERC under its Operat­
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lack quantifiers, which are essential for representing 
general knowledge. With quantifiers one can repre­
sent an assertion about a whole class of individuals 
using a single sentence, while in a propositional lan­
guage this would require a separate sentence for each 
individual. As a result, important knowledge structur­
ing techniques, like taxonomies, cannot be applied to 
propositional representations. 
However, graphical representations have important ad­
vantages of their own. In particular, they support ef 
ficient reasoning algorithms. These algorithms are fa 
more efficient than the symbolic reasoning mechanism� 
typical of more general representations. 
This dichotomy of utility has lead to proposals fo' 
hybrid uses of general and graphical representations 
In particular, Breese et al. (BGW91] have proposul 
the technique of knowledge based model construe 
tion (KBMC) : the automatic construction of propo 
sitionaljgraphical models for specific problems from ' 
larger knowledge base expressed in a general repre 
sentation. Breese et al. provide a number of moti­
vations for this approach that extend the arguments 
given above. 
We refer the reader to [BGW91] for this motivation, 
and take as our starting point that KBMC is a po­
tentially useful technique, certainly worth examining 
in more detail. Our contribution, then, is to look 
more closely at a particular mechanism for perform­
ing KBMC. In particular, we develop a mechanism in 
which a first-order probability logic [Bac90b] is used 
to represent the general knowledge base, and model 
construction is performed using ideas arising from thr' 
study of direct inference. Direct inference involve. 
reasoning from general statistical knowledge to prob 
abilities assigned to particular cases and has beei 
worked on by a number of authors including [BGHK92 
Bac90b, Kyb61, Kyb74, Lev80, Lou87, Pol90, Sal71 ] 
Our mechanism brings to light the important role ex 
pressive-first-order probability logics can play in rep 
resenting general probabilistic knowledge, and the im 
portant relationship between KBMC and direct infer 
ence. 
In the sequel, we first introduce a probability logi• 
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that can be used for the representation of general 
probabilistic and logical knowledge, and demonstrate 
that it is capable of representing any Bayesian net­
work [Pea86]-pe'rhaps the most important of current 
graphical representations. Then we discuss how ideas 
from direct inference can be used to specify a model 
construction procedure that can construct graphical 
models for particular problems. We point out how 
this idea is related to, but strictly more general than, 
template models. Throughout our discussion we try to 
point out various insights about the process of KBMC 
offered by our approach. Finally, we close with some 
conclusions and indications for future work. 
2 Representing Gener al Probabilistic 
Knowledge 
KBMC requires a mechanism for representing general 
knowledge. This representation should be declarative, 
for a number of good reasons that are beyond the scope 
of this paper to discuss. Furthermore, the representa­
tion should have a precise semantics, so that we can 
specify exactly the meaning of the expressions in the 
knowledge base. Without precise semantics it would 
be impossible to verify the accuracy of the knowledge 
base. 
Since logical representations meet our desiderata, we 
propose as a representation mechanism a first-order 
logic for statistical information, developed by Bacchus 
[Bac90a] . This logic is basically first-order logic aug­
mented to allow the expression of various assertions 
about proportions. 
Syntactically, we augment an ordinary collection of 
first-order symbols with symbols useful for express­
ing numeric assertions, e.g., '1', '+', ';::: '. In ad­
dition to allowing the generation of ordinary first­
order formulas we also allow the generation of nu­
meric assertions involving proportions. For example, 
[P(x)]x = 0. 75, expresses the assertion that 75% of 
the individuals in the domain have property P, while 
0.45 ::; [R(x, y)](x,y} ::; 0.55 expresses the assertion 
that between 45% and 55% of all pairs of domain in­
dividuals stand in relation R. In general, if a is an 
existent formula and x is a vector of n variables, the 
proportion term [a]x denotes the proportion of n-ary 
vectors of domain individual that satisfy the formula 
a. Most of the statistical information we wish to ex­
press will in fact be statements of conditional probabil­
ity denoting relative proportions. For example, [ai.Blx 
will denote the proportion of n-ary vectors of domain 
individuals among those that satisfy ,B which also sat­
isfy a. We can then express various statistical asser­
tions by expressing various constraints on the values 
that these proportion terms can take. For example, 
by asserting that [Q(x)IP(x)]x = 0.5 we are asserting 
that the domain we are considering is such that 1/2 of 
the P's are Q's. 
We will not give a formal specification of the seman-
tics of our language here (see [Bac90b] for all such 
details) . The specification simply formalizes the fol­
lowing notion: a formula with free variables might be­
come true or false depending on how the variables an: 
instantiated. For example, bird(x) might be true when 
x = Tweety but false when x =Clyde. A proportion 
term, then, simply evaluates to the proportion of pos­
sible instantiations that make the formula true. 
This language can express an wide variety of statistical 
assertions ( [Bac90b] gives an extensive collection of ex­
amples) . It can also express whatever can be expressed 
in first-order logic, so essential structuring mechanisms 
like taxonomies can be applied. 
Example 1 Let the domain contain, among other 
things, a collection of coins, and a collection of coin­
tossing events. 1 In addition to some obvious symbols, 
let our language include the predicate Coin Toss( e) 
which is true of an individual e iff e is an coin-tossing 
event; Goin(x) which is true of x iff xis a coin; and 
Object( e, x) which holds of the individuals e and x iff 
e is an event and x is the object of that event: the ob­
ject of a coin-tossing event is the particular coin that 
is tossed. Now we can express the following: 
1. Ve, x. GoinToss( e) 1\ Object( e, x) ---> Goin(x). 
That is, the object of any coin toss is always a. 
coin. 
2. Vx.Fair(x) +-+ [Heads(e)IGoinToss(e) J' 
Object(e,x)]e E (.49, .51). We agree to call an;, 
coin x fair iff approximately 50% of the events in 
which it is tossed result in heads. This example 
demonstrates the useful interplay between univer· 
sal quantification and the proportion terms. 
3. [[Heads(e)IGoinToss(e) 1\ Object(e, x)]e E 
(0.49,0.51)1Goin(x)Jx = 0.95. This formula says 
that 95% of all coins are such that approximately 
50% of the events in which they are tossed re­
sult in heads. That is, 95% of the coins in the 
domain are approximately fair. This example 
demonstrates the useful ability to nest proportion 
statements. 
3 Representing Bayesian Networks 
Using the logic described in the previous section we 
can represent a large knowledge base of general logi­
cal and statistical information by a collection of sen. 
tences. It is not difficult to see that any discrete val­
ued Bayesian network can easily be represented in thf 
1The explicit inclusion of events in the domain of indi­
viduals is similar to the inclusion of other abstract object,: 
like time points or situations (as in the situation calculu.> 
[MH69]). There may be philosophical objections, but tech­
nical difficulties can be avoided if we restrict ourselves t; 
a finite collection of distinct events. 
logic. 2 Here we will give a particular scheme for repre­
senting an arbitrary network, although there are many 
other schemes possible. 
Any Bayesian network is completely specified by two 
pieces of information: (1) a product decomposition of 
the joint distribution which specifies the topological 
structure of the network, and (2) matrices of condi­
tional probability values which parameterize the nodes 
in the network [Pea88J . Consider an arbitrary network 
B. Let the nodes in B be the set {X1, ... ,Xn}- Each 
node Xi has some set of parents {XJ(i,l)> ... , Xf(i,qi)}, 
where f( i, j) gives the index of node Xi's j-th parent, 
and qi is the number of parents of Xi- Furthermore 
each node Xi can take one of some discrete set of val­
ues { v1, ... , Vki}, where ki is the number of different 
values for xi. 
The topological structure of B is completely specified 
by the equation 
Pr(X1, ... , Xn) = Pr(X1IX!(l,l), ... ,Xf(l,ql))x 
···X Pr(XniXt(n,l)> ... ,Xf(n,qn))-
That is, the topological structure of B is equivalent 
to an assertion about how the joint distribution over 
the nodes X1-Xn can be decomposed into a product 
of lower-order conditionals. Actually, this equation is 
shorthand. Its full specification is that this product 
decomposition holds for every collection of values the 
nodes XcXn can take on. 
We can translate this equation into a sentence of our 
logic by creating a fnnction symbol for every node Xi; 
for convenience we use the same symbol Xi. Now the 
above structure equation can be rewritten as the sen­
tence 
Vz1,···,Zn.[X1(e)=z1/\ ···1\Xn(e)=zn]e= [X1(e) = z1 1 Xt(1,1) = Z£(1,1) 1\ ... J x 1\ Xt(1,q1) = Zf(1,q1) e 
[ I Xf(n,1) = Zf(n,1) 1\ . . . ] X Xn(e)=Zn 1\X . f(n,qn) = Zf(n,qn) e 
Here we have treated the multi-valued nodes as func­
tion symbols XrXn in our language. Our translated 
sentence asserts that for every particular set of val­
ues the X1-Xn can take on, the proportion of events e 
that achieve that set of values can be computed from 
the lower-order relative proportions. The universal 
quantification ensures that this product decomposition 
holds of every collection of values. 
Having completely specified the topological structure 
of B, we can equally easily specify the conditional 
probability parameters in our language. For each node 
Xi, B provides the probability of Xi taking on any of 
its allowed values under every possible instantiation of 
2It is also possible, with a few technical caveats, to rep­
resent networks with continuous valued nodes. But here 
we restrict our attention to discrete valued nodes. 
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its parents Xf(i,l), ... ,Xf(i,qi)· This matrix of cone 
tional probabilities consists of a collection of individm 
equations each of the form 
Pr(Xi = tiiXt(i,l) = tf(i,l), · · ·, Xf(i,qi) = tf(i,qi)) = p, 
where tj is some value for variable Xj, and p is some 
numeric probability value. 
To translate these equations into sentences of our logic 
we create new constant symbols for every possible 
value ti of every node Xi; for convenience we use the 
same symbol ti. Now the above equation can be rewrit­
ten as the sentence 
[Xi( e)= ti l Xt(i,l)(e) � tf(i:!_) 1\ _· ·.· ] = p. 1\ xf(l,ql) (e) - tf(l,ql) e 
Here we have simply rewritten the conditional proba 
bility equations as equations involving the proportiu 
of events in which Xi takes on value ti. 
The above procedure can be applied to any networ� 
Thus we make the following observation. Any discret. 
valued Bayesian network can be represented as a Cur 
lection of sentences in the knowledge base. 
What is important to point out about this transla 
tion is that the translated assertions represent templat.: 
networks. As pointed out in [BGW91] most probabilis 
tic networks in use in consultation systems are actuall}' 
template models. That is, the nodes represent gener­
alized events which get instantiated to the particular 
event under consideration. For example, a node rep­
resenting "Disease D" will be instantiated to "Patient 
John R. Smith has disease D, " a node representing 
"Blood test shows low white cell count" will be instan­
tiated to "Blood test T0906 for patient John R. Smith 
shows low white cell count," etc. In our representation 
the template nature of the networks is made explicit: 
our formulas refer to proportions over classes of sim­
ilar events not particular events. As we will see this 
is not a limitation in representational power, rather it 
is simply a more accurate representation which allows 
for greater modularity. Propositional networks refer 
ring to particular events are to be generated from the 
knowledge base via model construction techniques. 
4 Simple Model Construction 
To introduce the basic ideas that underlie our mode' 
construction technique consider a knowledge base thai 
consists simply of a collection of template Bayesian 
networks, each one applicable to different types of 
events. 
To specify that each different decomposition, and col­
lection of conditional probability parameters, is appli­
cable to a different class of events we only need add the 
event type as an extra conditioning formula. For ex­
ample, say that we have two networks both suitable for 
diagnosing abdominal pain. However, one of the net 
works is designed for women in late-term pregnane}. 
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(1) 
\fz1, z2, zs.[Xl (e) = z1 1\ X2( e) = z2 1\ Xs( e) = zsiAbdominalPain( e) 1\ -.Pregnancy( e)]e 
= [X1 (e) = z1 IAbdominalPain( e) 1\ -.Pregnancy( e )]e 
x [X2(e) = z2 IX1(e) = z1 1\AbdominalPain(e) 1\ --.Pregnancy(e)]e 
x [Xs( e)= zsiX1( e)= Z1 1\ X2(e) = z2 1\ AbdominalPain(e) 1\ -.Pregnancy( e)]e, 
(2) 
\fz1,Z2,zs.[Y1(e) = z1 1\ Y2(e) = z2 1\ Ys(e) = zsiAbdominaiPain(e) 1\ Pregnancy(e)]e 
= [¥1 (e) = z1IAbdominalPain( e) 1\ Pregnancy( e )]e 
X [Y2(e) = z2 IY1(e) = z1 1\ AbdominalPain(e) 1\ Pregnancy(e)]e 
x [Ys(e) = zs1Y1(e) = z1 1\ AbdominalPain(e) 1\ Pregnancy(e)]e· 
. 
Figure 1: Alternate Structures for Abdominal Pain 
while the other is suitable for other patients with ab­
dominal pain. Our general knowledge base might con­
tain the two formulas (Equations 1 and 2) shown in 
Figure 1. 
In this example the events involving abdominal pain 
and pregnancy have a different network models (i.e., 
structural decompositions) with entirely different vari­
ables than the events where there is no pregnancy. In 
a similar manner we can represent a whole collection 
of disjoint types of events, where each event type is 
modeled by a different probabilistic structure. 
In this case the model construction technique in 
this case would simply locate the appropriate tem­
plate model using information about the particular 
event being reasoned about. For example, if the 
event is EOOl and we know AbdominalPain(EOOl) 1\ 
Pregnancy(EOOl ), i.e., the event being reasoned about 
involves adominal pain in a pregnant patient, we would 
construct a network model for reasoning about EOOl 
using the second template model. This network would 
have the structure 
Pr(Y1, Y2 , Y3) = Pr(Y1) x Pr(Y2 1Yl) x Pr(Y31Yl), 
and would be parameterized by the values specified 
in the knowledge base for the Yi variables. Since 
the constructed network is now specific to event EOOl 
we can drop the extra condition AbdominalPain( e) 1\ 
Pregancy( e) as we know that EOOl satisfies these con­
ditions. Now we have an event specific network that 
can be used to reason about the probable values of the 
variables Yi in the particular event. 
We can see that the model constructor is simply "in­
stantiating" the general template model with the par­
ticular event EOOl. By using the same structure and 
probability parameters as the class of abdominal pain­
pregnancy events we are assigning probabilities to the 
particular event EOOl that are identical to the statis­
tics we have about that general class of events. This 
is an example of direct inference, where we use statis­
tics over a class of similar events to assign probabilities 
to a particular event. For example, when we assign a 
probability of 1/2 to the event of heads on a particu­
lar coin toss based on statistics from a series of coin 
tosses we are performing direct inference. This kind of 
inference is pervasive in reasoning under uncertainty.3 
3See Kyburg [Kyb83a] for further arguments pointing 
Simple model construction of this kind is not tha, 
interesting however. We could easily accomplish the 
same thing with a control structure that chooses frou 
some collection of networks. The main difference b 
that here we have an explicit, declarative, represen 
tation of which network is applicable to what type cr 
event. Furthermore, it also serves to illustrate the b<1 
sic idea behind our approach to KBMC. 
5 More General Model Construction 
In general we will not have explicit template models 
in our knowledge base for all of the events we wish 
to reason about. Indeed, this is exactly the point of 
the KBMC approach: we want to deal with situation:> 
beyond the ability of template models. 
Our knowledge base will more likely contain informa 
tion about conditional probabilities isolated to neigh 
borhoods of related variables. For example, instead 
of having an explicit product decomposition for all of 
the relevant variables, as in the above examples, th•· 
knowledge base might simply contain the individua. 
product terms, i.e., the neighborhood information, in 
isolation. It will be up to the model construction pro­
cedure to link these individual terms into a joint dis 
tribution. Consider Pearl's classic Holmes's burglar:·· 
example. It is unlikely that Holmes has in his knowl­
edge base an explicitly represented decomposition of 
the form shown in Equation 3 (Figure 2). Such a de 
composition is simply far too specific. Rather Holme­
would more typically have information like that shown 
in Equation 4 (Figure 2). In this case Holmes has the 
knowledge (a) in 75% of the events in which a house 
with an alarm is burglarized, the alarm will sound; 
(b) in 45% of the events in which an alarm sounds 
near where a person lives that person will report the 
alarm; (c) the specific knowledge that Watson lives 
near Holmes's house and that Holmes's house has an 
alarm. The advantage of knowledge in this more gen­
eral form is that it can be used to reason about many 
other types of events. For example, the statistic�! 
knowledge (a) can be used to reason about any alarn1 
in any house, e.g., if Holmes learns that his parent& 
house alarm has been tripped; similarly (b) can b 
out the prevalence of "direct inference" in probabilisti 
reasoning. 
Probability Logics for KBMC 223 
(3) 
[Burglary( e, MyHouse) A AlarmSound( e, My House) A ReportsAlarm( e, Watson, MyHouse )]e 
= [AlarmSound( e, My House) !Burglary( e, MyHouse )]e 
x [ReportsAlarm( e, Watson, My House) IAlarmSound( e, My House )]e-
(a) [AlarmSound(e,x)jBurglary(e,x) AHouseWithAlarm(x)](e,x) = .75 
(b) [ReportsAlarm(e, y, x)l (4) AlarmSound(e,x) A HouseWithAlarm(x) A LivesNear(x,y)](e,x,y) = 0 . 45 
(c) LivesNear(MyHouse, Watson) A HouseWithAlarm(MyHouse) 
Figure 2: An overly Specific Decomposition vs. General Information 
used for reasoning about reports from any neighbor, 
e.g., if Mrs. Gibbons reported the alarm instead of Dr. 
Watson. 
Holmes will also have other pieces of statistical infor­
mation, e.g. , statistics about the event that a house 
has been burglarized given that a police car is parked 
outside, and other pieces of information specific to the 
particular event being reasoned about. The task, then, 
of a model construction procedure is to use the infor­
mation specific to the particular event being reasoned 
about to decide which local pieces of statistical infor­
mation are relevant and how they should be linked 
into a Bayesian network representation. Once a net­
work has been constructed it can be used to quickly 
perform a range of complex reasoning about the par­
ticular event. 
There are three issues that arise when constructing a 
Bayesian network model of the particular event we are 
reasoning about. First, the model construction proce­
dure must have some information about the variables 
(properties of the event in question) that we wish to in­
clude in the constructed network. Second, we must use 
information about the particular event to locate ap­
propriate pieces of local statistical information in the 
knowledge base. And third, we must combine these 
local pieces of information into a network. 
5.1 The Set of Variables 
Some information must be supplied about what collec­
tion of variables we want to model in the constructed 
network. In the simplest case we will just supply 
a query about the particular event under consider­
ation along with some additional information about 
that event. For example, we might be reasoning 
about event E002 and the guery might be expressed 
as Burglary(E002)?; i.e., did a burglary occur as 
part of this event? We might also have the informa­
tion ReportsAlarm(E002, Watson, My House), i.e. , Dr. 
Watson reported an alarm at Holmes's house during 
this event. If the knowledge base is similar to that 
given above, the procedure could determine that it can 
chain probabilistic influence from a report by Watson 
to belief in the alarm sounding, and then from there 
to a belief in a burglary, i.e. , to an inference about 
the query. Given that this is the only chain of influ­
ence it can find in the knowledge base linking alarm 
reports and burglaries, the constructed network will 
only contain a burglary node, an alarm sound nod< , 
and an alarm report node. That is, in a strictly query 
driven KBMC procedure the constructed model will 
only contain variables relevant to the particular quen 
Alternately, we could supply the procedure with mor 
information. For example, we could specify a set c 
variables that we wish to include in the constructed 
model. For example, we could specify that we are also 
interested in reasoning about earthquakes and radio 
broadcasts. If the knowledge base has local statistics 
about the frequency of alarms sounding given earth­
quakes, and radio reports given earthquakes, a larger 
Bayesian network could be constructed that includes 
nodes for these variables. The links between these 
variables would be determined by the local statistic·· 
contained in the knowledge base. For example, if w 
know the frequency of alarm triggers given earthquak' 
events, we would plac�a link from the earthquake noel-) 
to the alarm node in the constructed network. 
As in the simple query driven case, however, the proc.o 
dure would still be able to add additional intermediat. · 
variables that link the variables in the set of inter 
est. These intermediate variables would be found b:· 
looking through the knowledge base for chains of in 
ftuences between the specified variables. For example, 
if we inform the procedure to build a model of some 
set of diseases {D1, ... , Dn} and some set of symp 
toms { 81, ... , Bm}, it can search for chains of local 
conditional probabilities linking members of these tw•> 
sets. Hence, the constructed network will generally 
contain additional intermediary nodes describing the 
causal processes known to link the diseases with the 
various symptoms, just as the alarm sound informa­
tion linked burglaries and alarm reports in the query 
driven case. 
It seems likely that we would want to amortize the ef­
fort of constructing the Bayesian network over a whole 
range of queries. Hence, we will probably want to sup­
ply the model constructor with more information than 
just a single query. 
5.2 Locating the Appropriate Local Statistic. 
Inform�tion about the particular event will help deter 
mine which collection of local statistics are appropri 
ate. The issue of choosing appropriate statistics is a 
the heart of the difficulties in direct inference. Q], 
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approaches to direct inference revolved around try­
ing to find appropriate reference classes from which 
statistics can be. drawn [Kyb83b ]. More recent work 
has taken an approach based on the principle of indif­
ference that dispenses with the notion of a. reference 
class altogether [BGHK92]. In general, however, de­
termining the probabilities to assign to a particular 
event given a collection of statistical information about 
classes of similar events is a very difficult problem. For 
a practical enterprise like KBMC, however, we can use 
the work on direct inference to derive general guide­
lines as to what statistics to consider. For example, 
all approaches to direct inference validate the subset 
or specificity preference: one should choose the most 
specific statistics applicable to the event in question. 
Similarly, if we have statistical information about a 
specific individual involved in the event we should use 
that. 
Information about the particular event can alter both 
the parameterization and the structure of the con­
structed Bayesian network. This flexibility is not pos­
sible with simple template models. Consider the fol­
lowing example. 
Example 2 Say that the local information shown in 
Figure 3 was contained in the knowledge base. And 
say that our information about the particular event 
was ReportsAlarm(E002, Watson, MyHouse). If it is 
decided that AlarmSound should be placed in the con­
structed network, either because it is a variable of in­
terest or because it is in a chain of influences to a 
variable of interest, then the procedure would have to 
choose how to parameterize the link from the My House 
alarm sound node and the Watson alarm report node. 
The only statistic we have about the chance of an 
alarm report given an alarm concerns the class of peo­
ple who live near the house whose alarm sounded. In 
this case we know Dr. Watson is a member of this class, 
i.e. , LivesNear(MyHouse, Watson), so item 1 gives the 
most specific known probability of a report given an 
alarm. However, we do have a more specific statistic 
for Dr. Watson, item 3, in the case of a report when 
there is no alarm, indicating that Watson is a bit of a 
practical joker. Hence, this more specific value would 
be used for the probability of a report given no alarm. 
On the other hand if the event in question involved 
a report by Mrs. Gibbons, we would be forced to use 
the more general statistics 1 and 2 to parameterize the 
alarm-report/alarm-sound link as we have no specific 
statistics for Mrs. Gibbon's alarm reports. 
Example 3 Let the knowledge base be as in F igure 3, 
except augmented by the additional statistical infor­
mation shown in Figure 4. That is, in this case Holmes 
has a special alarm installed by a security company 
AlarmMonitorCompany with a direct line to their of­
fice, and from the company's literature about the ac­
curacy of their alarm systems Holmes has come to ac­
cept the above statistical assertion about the reliabil­
ity of their alarm reports. Now if the event was Re-
portsAlarm(E003, AlarmMonitorCompany, MyHous< 
there would be no need for the model constructio ' 
procedure to include an intermediary node of alan , 
sound, nor would the direction of the links be require. 
to go from burglaries towards alarm reports. Instea' I 
it could use this statistic, as the particular event EOO J 
is a member of this class of events, to link the alan 
report node directly to the burglary node, and a quit· 
different network structure would result. 
5.3 Linking the Local Pieces 
Once appropriate local statistics are obtained from the 
·database we have enough information to link various 
nodes in the network. That is, each local statistic will 
serve to parameterize a link between two nodes in the 
network. A difficulty that arises here is justifying thi , 
composition. 
All we really know about the probability distributio: .. 
describing the interaction between the variables ar 
the local conditional probabilities. There will in gen 
eral be many different joint probability distribution", 
that are consistent with these local conditional prob 
abilities. In linking up the nodes in a manner d€ 
termined solely by the local information we are cou 
structing a particular joint distribution, one in whie1 
the local conditional probabilities determine a produ..; 
decomposition. An important question is: to what ex 
tent is such a procedure justified? Lewis [LI59] prow" I 
some results which show that by taking the produc 
of local conditional probabilities one obtains a best es 
timator in the sense of Kullback-Leibler cross-entrop) 
[KL51]. But his results do not cover all of the cases 
that might occur. Another justification comes from re­
cent work that applies the principle of indifference to 
reasoning about change [BGHK93]. For an enterprise 
like KBMC, however, we will again want to use gen­
eral principles derived from such work. One general 
principle arising from [BGHK93], and earlier work by 
Hunter [Hun89], is that when the variables are causally 
related, as compared to being simply correlated, using 
the product of the local conditional probabilities can 
be justified by principles of indifference. 
A related difficulty occurs when we have some but nm 
all of the information required to specify the parame 
terization of the network. For example, we might hav 
statistics about a number of distinct causes for an d 
feet, but we might not have statistics about their join. 
effect. Pearl [Pea88] has suggested the use of "proto 
typical structures" like noisy OR gates. There is P.J 
underlying probabilistic model from which noisy 0 I 
gates arise, and when it is reasonable to assume tha' 
this model holds in a domain, prototypical structure ; 
of this form could be used. Alternately, the indiffer 
ence considerations of [BGHK93, Hun89] can also t,. 
used in certain cases to complete the joint distribution 
over the different causes. 
1. [ReportsAlarm(e,y,x)l 
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AlarmSound( e, x) 1\ HouseWithAlarm(x) 1\ LivesNear(x,y)](e,x,y) = 0.45 
2. [ReportsAlarm(e,y,x)l 
·AlarmSound(e,x) 1\ HouseWithAlarm(x) 1\ LivesNear(x,y)](e,x,y) = 0.05 
3. [ReportsAlarm(e, Watson,x)l 
·AlarmSound(e,x) 1\ HouseWithAlarm(x) 1\ LivesNear(x, Watson)](e,x) = 0.15 
4. HouseWithAlarm(MyHouse) 1\ LivesNear(MyHouse, Watson) 
5. LivesNear(MyHouse, Gibbons) 
Figure 3: Knowledge Base for Example 2 
6. [Burglary(e,MyHouse) IReportsAlarm(e,AlarmMonitorCompany,MyHouse)]e = 0.90 
7. [Burglary(e,MyHouse) I•ReportsAlarm(e,AlarmMonitorCompany, MyHouse)]e = 0.05 
Figure 4: Additional Knowledge for Example 3 
6 Conclusions and Future Work 
We have outlined a mechanism for KBMC of Bayesian 
networks from a knowledge base expressed in a first­
order probabilistic logic. Although we have only been 
able to present a sketch of how the mechanism works 
we have discussed the main ideas behind the proposal: 
(1) identify the variables of interest either through a 
query driven process or through information provided 
by the user; (2) locate local statistics, relevant to the 
particular event being reasoned about, by using prin­
ciples from work on direct inference, like specificity, to 
prefer certain local st�tistics over others; (3) construct 
chains of probabilistic influence from these local statis­
tics; ( 4) construct an event specific network by using 
the chains of probabilistic influence to specify the arcs 
in the network, and by using the local statistics to 
parameterize the nodes, perhaps filling in missing pa­
rameters by using prototypical structures or principles 
of indifference. The resulting network can then be used 
to reason probabilistically about the particular event. 
The mechanism can be actualized fairly easily in 
straightforward cases. In such cases the chains of influ­
ence are easy to locate: the individual links are explic­
itly expressed in the knowledge base. If the statistics 
in the knowledge base are of a form such that select­
ing the most appropriate statistics reduces to simple 
specificity considerations and if we have sufficient sta­
tistical information, we can easily parameterize the re­
sulting structure. Such a mechanism, although limited 
in some ways, already offers a considerable increase in 
flexibility over current template models. 
One issue we have not addressed here is a mechanism 
for representing temporal information, but as shown 
by Bacchus et al. [BTH91] first-order logic is suffi­
cient for representing a range of temporal ontologies. 
Hence, once an appropriate temporal ontology is de­
cided upon, it is possible that the representation could 
be extended to allow for temporal information. If 
the temporal structure is discrete we could also al-
low the formation of proportion statements over time 
points, thus allowing the expression of various asser­
tions about discrete stochastic processes. A related 
issue that can be addressed is the representation of 
utilities. Extending our representation to utilities and 
temporal information, and the KBMC procedure WP 
proposed to generate, e.g., influence diagrams, is hU 
interesting area for future research. Current work uH 
this model is focused on filling in the details of th. 
mechanism we have sketched, and on building a pro 
totype system. 
In conclusion, we feel that our proposal is a wori< 
able one, that, with sufficient resources, can be turnt'•: 
into a prototype implementation. Work on this is con 
tinuting. Such an implementation holds the promis 
of a useful KBMC procedure that would be far mor, 
general than current template models. There are, o 
course, limitations to the approach, limitations that. 
stem mainly from problems that arise during dire.�r 
inference. Given a very general knowledge base of sta­
tistical information it will not always be possible tl) 
choose the "most appropriate" statistical information 
for an event. For example, we might have conflict­
ing statistical information that cannot be resolved by 
specificity. Nevertheless, we can still obtain useful re­
sults in less general but, we hope, still practical, con­
texts. 
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